In a rare turn of events, SEC Commissioner Hester Peirce, widely known as "Crypto Mom," delivered a speech that challenged America’s financial surveillance system while openly embracing Cypherpunk ideals. From critiquing decades-old laws to championing privacy technologies like zero-knowledge proofs, Peirce's address marked a striking moment of regulatory rebellion.

In the cryptocurrency world, government oversight typically represents the primary barrier to privacy technology advancement. However, on August 4, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Commissioner Hester Peirce delivered a remarkable address at the University of California, Berkeley. During her speech, she referenced the Cypherpunk Manifesto while openly critiquing America's financial surveillance infrastructure and expressing robust support for privacy innovations including zero-knowledge proofs and decentralized networks.
Hester Pierce, widely known as "Crypto Mom," took the extraordinary step of aligning with those under regulatory oversight. Her position proved more progressive than many cryptocurrency advocates themselves demonstrate.
The moment represented nothing less than a regulatory awakening.
Peanut Butter and Watermelon: A Regulator's Awakening
August 4, University of California, Berkeley.
SEC Commissioner Hester Peirce delivered a speech that left the audience speechless. The presentation, titled "Peanut Butter and Watermelon: Financial Privacy in the Digital Age," initially sounded like culinary commentary but proved to be a fierce critique on the existing financial regulatory framework.
Peirce began with a family anecdote: her grandfather, who despised watermelon and would coat it with thick layers of peanut butter to make it palatable. This peculiar combination invariably attracted neighborhood children during summer picnics. Years later, when a telephone operator connected a call for her grandfather, the operator asked, "Are you Mr. Peirce, the one who puts peanut butter on watermelon?" The operator turned out to be one of those curious children from decades past.
Peirce's real interest was not in the unusual food combination, but in the telephone operatora, a profession destined for obsolescence through technological advancement. Later automatic switching systems enabled direct dialing between parties, eliminating human intermediaries and, crucially, preventing neighbors from eavesdropping on private conversations.
By all accounts, Peirce should have been a staunch defender of financial regulation. A Case Western Reserve University School of Law graduate, she spent years navigating the Senate Banking Committee before President Trump appointed her as SEC Commissioner in 2018.
The crypto industry gave her the nickname "Crypto Mom" for her comparatively friendly stance toward digital assets. But in this speech, she shed her mild image entirely.
Cryptocurrency industry participants bestowed upon her the moniker "Crypto Mom" due to her relatively accommodating approach toward digital assets than her regulatory peers. However, this speech saw her completely shed her moderate persona and take a decidedly radical stance.
"We cannot expect governments, corporations, or other large, faceless organizations to grant us privacy out of their beneficence."
This quotation comes from Eric Hughes's 1993 work, "A Cypherpunk Manifesto," a piece rooted in techno-anarchist philosophy. When a government official cites anarchist literature to critique governmental systems, the scenario resembles a police officer invoking criminal testimony to condemn law enforcement practices.
Peirce didn't stop there.
"By design or deficiency, the law will not protect us, technology might."
The statement sounded nothing like typical civil servant rhetoric and everything like a technological revolution manifesto.
The Blunt Instrument
Peirce's most pointed criticism targeted the existing financial surveillance system.
She began by dismantling the "third-party doctrine," a legal framework enabling law enforcement to obtain bank-held information without warrants. As a government employee, she condemned her own employer for wielding this doctrine as an all-purpose tool.
"The third-party doctrine is a key pillar of financial surveillance in this country," she observed, pointing out the absurdity: while banks employ encryption to shield customer data from criminals, the doctrine strips customers of any privacy expectations regarding that same encrypted information. Put simply, banks can safeguard data from thieves, yet the government maintains unrestricted access.
Her criticism then shifted to the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA), a piece of legislation nearing its 60th anniversary that requires financial institutions to establish anti-money laundering programs and essentially transforms them into government informants.
The statistics are overwhelming.
During fiscal year 2024, 324,000 financial institutions filed over 25 million transaction reports with the government, comprising 4.7 million Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) and 20.5 million Currency Transaction Reports (CTRs).
"The Bank Secrecy Act deputized American financial institutions as de facto law enforcement investigators," Peirce stated directly.
The government, she contended, has cultivated a "better safe than sorry" culture that pushes banks to flag every potentially questionable transaction, resulting in an avalanche of worthless data that obscures genuinely significant intelligence.
She didn't spare her own agency either. The SEC's Consolidated Audit Trail (CAT) system tracks every stock and options trade from order initiation through execution. Peirce and her colleagues have characterized it as a "product of a dystopian surveillance state." The system has proven financially disastrous, with costs reaching $518 million by late 2022 without completion, which is nearly eight times the original budget. Worse, it provides thousands of SEC personnel and private contractors with unlimited access to anyone's trading records without requiring criminal suspicion.
It's akin to imagining an FBI agent publicly condemning wiretap laws, or a tax officer defending tax evasion, as Peirce had placed herself on the opposite side of the system she serves.
Technological Redemption
Since legal protections have proven inadequate, Peirce believes technology may offer a solution.
She has publicly championed a suite of privacy-preserving technologies: zero-knowledge proofs (ZK), smart contracts, public blockchains, and decentralized physical infrastructure networks (DePIN). Cryptocurrency veterans will recognize these concepts immediately.
These technologies' appeal stems from their ability to circumvent traditional intermediaries. Zero-knowledge proofs enable individuals to verify identity or age without disclosing additional information. Privacy mixers can conceal income, donations, and purchase histories. Decentralized networks eliminate centralized service providers entirely. Certain blockchains incorporate native privacy features, functioning like the private telephone lines of previous eras that protected sensitive conversations.
Peirce even embraced the radical sentiment implied in Hughes' Manifesto: these technologies should be allowed to flourish "even though doing so enables people to use them for bad purpose."
Such a statement carries particular weight coming from a government regulator.
She drew upon historical precedent for support. During the 1990s, the government sought to maintain exclusive control over strong encryption technology, citing national security concerns. However, internet development required widespread encryption access. A determined group of cryptographers mounted successful resistance, ultimately persuading the government to permit civilian encryption use.
Phil Zimmermann, creator of PGP software, stood among the champions of that struggle. Thanks to their efforts, society today can send secure emails, transfer funds online, and shop safely.
Peirce elevated privacy protection to constitutional significance, citing Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis:
"To be most on our guard to protect liberty when the government's purposes are beneficent."
She urged the government to protect citizens' capacity for both private communication and private value transfer, mirroring the cash transactions that existed when the Fourth Amendment was drafted.
"Key to a person's dignity is her ability to decide to whom she will reveal information about herself," she emphasized. "The American people and their government should guard zealously people's right to live private lives and to use technologies that enable them to do so."
Her speech occurred during the ongoing trial of Tornado Cash co-founder Roman Storm, which exemplifies government prosecution of privacy technology developers.
On this matter, Peirce spoke without ambiguity: "Developers of open-source privacy software should not have to answer for the actions that other people take using the software they wrote"
More Radical Than the Geeks
Interestingly, Peirce's positions diverge from Hughes' views and prove even more radical in certain respects.
In the Cypherpunk Manifesto, Hughes wrote:
"If two parties have some sort of dealings, then each has a memory of their interaction. Each party can speak about their own memory of this; how could anyone prevent it? "
This is, in essence, a defense of the third-party doctrine: once individuals provide information to banks, those institutions can naturally share it with the government.
Peirce, however, attacks precisely this framework, contending that individuals should maintain privacy control even when information resides with third parties.
The divergence proves fascinating. Hughes, as a techno-anarchist, accepted certain harsh systemic realities to some degree, while Peirce, operating within the system itself, demands more comprehensive privacy protections.
This dynamic is reminiscent of the zeal of converts, similar to devout Korean Christians who travel the world to evangelize with exceptional fervor. As a regulator, Peirce has a deeper understanding of systemic flaws than most. Her extensive experience in regulation has led her to believe that genuine protection may come not from expanding oversight, but from the technology itself.
Nevertheless, transforming public attitudes remains challenging. Hughes once wrote: "For privacy to be widespread it must be part of a social contract. "
Peirce acknowledges this challenge. Whenever she criticizes financial surveillance, someone inevitably says: "I have nothing to hide. It is wonderful that law enforcement is watching everyone's financial transactions so that it can get the bad guys." She counters by referencing privacy scholar Daniel Solove, who argues that this "nothing to hide" perspective reflects narrow privacy understanding while deliberately overlooking broader harms from government surveillance programs.
Over thirty years ago, Hughes wrote: "The Cypherpunks are actively engaged in making the networks safer for privacy. Let us proceed together apace."
Three decades later, Peirce's address serves as a response to that call.
Her contradictions are what make the address so compelling: a regulator championing technology she oversees, a government official citing anarchist philosophy to critique government policy, a traditional financial system guardian advocating for decentralized revolution.
If Hughes were alive today to hear Peirce's words, he might smile and say: "She is one of us."